Daily Sources 1/6

1. Jim Lobe reports on his blog that the Nelson Report last night had the story that Dennis Ross will be made the Obama Administration's Special Envoy for Iran. Ross is someone sure to please hard line Israel supporters, and has some connection to the neo-cons. That said, as I have argued in my post on Law and Revolution in Iran, though we should be open to talks with Iran, there is no reason to have anything other than a hardheaded approach to such talks. Nelson also reported that Richard Haas will be Special Envoy for Israel-Arab affairs, Richard Holbrooke will be Special Envoy for India and Pakistan, and Anne Marie Slaughter head of policy planning.

In the meantime, Azadeh Moaveni in the Wall Street Journal reports that the Ahmadinejad regime is using the conflict in Gaza as cover for the intimidation of Shirin Ebadi. This had been going on for a little while before the Israeli incursion, but have become more aggressive since. The focus on Ebadi really illuminates how threatening she is to the legitimacy of the regime. But her struggle will have to compete with images from the Gaza for now, like the Korean footage of a young woman standing in front of Israeli soldiers to prevent them firing assault rifles at crowds of protesting Palestians linked by Juan Cole:



Brave young woman.

2. Elza Turner at Platts reports that traffic through the Suez canal is down "35-50% in December compared to the previous month and the year-ago month." Though I am unsure what the sentence means, precisely, it would seem to indicate that traffic is down substantially. The traffic reduction is down mostly on piracy in the Gulf of Aden and trade finance issues. Rerouting ships around the Cape of Good Hope can increase transit times by as much as 14 days. The amount of time spent at sea keeps a substantial amount of cargo space off the market. The decision last month by a number of shippers to avoid the Suez does seem to have put a bit of a bottom under the market, given the Baltic Dry Index:



But this does not seem to have been sufficient to create much of a recovery in the market, given the heights from which it fell:



If I remember correctly, the success of the super oil tanker--or Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCC)--was ensured by the cut off of the Suez Canal, once upon a time. David Osler at Lloyd's List reports that the international coalition of navies off the Somalian coast is having some success. Issues of jurisdiction and the cost of trying the pirates is still an issue, but the shipping industry appears fairly confident the suppression effort will succeed. The piece gives a useful summary for those interested in the topic.

3. The AP reports that an Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander called on the Islamic world to initiate another oil embargo in retaliation for the West's support of Israel in Gaza. There was a similar call last week from parliamentarians in Bahrain.

4. Dave Ernsberger at The Barrel reports that the Lu'an Group in China produced its first transportation fuels from coal in December at a rate of 160,000 mt/year (or 12.8 kb/d). China is the only country outside of South Africa which has a fully up and running coal to liquids plant. The plant is expected to ramp up production to 3 million metric tonnes/year (~ 60 kb/d) between 2012-2015 and to 15 million metric tonnes/year by 2020 (~ 300 kb/d). Given 7.7 mb/d of total oil consumption in China in 2008, 300 kb/d is 3.9% of that. If you believe that China will be consuming 20 mb/d by 2020, 300 kb/d is 1.5% of that. China, South America, and the United States have huge coal reserves, but so far these technologies produce as much or more carbon emissions than coal burning power plants.

5. MSNBC has footage of Chinese laborers who are protesting outside a factory facing down policemen trying to stop the cameramen from filming the scene:

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

6. Hugo Restall has an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal Asia which notes that China has made it public that it is in the market for an air craft carrier. Although the carrier would be technologically behind US versions, it would make China the only East-Asian nation with carrier capacity.

"China hesitated for years before declaring its intent to develop carrier capability because of the potential reaction of its neighbors. A Chinese aircraft carrier prowling the neighborhood could be the final straw that causes Southeast Asian nations to band together to protect their claims, or strengthen ties with the U.S. In particular, Vietnam has periodically hinted that it might put aside the past and form an alliance with Washington."

The announcement may have been made because just now it feels in Asia as if American power is ebbing and unreliable. Restall fears it could touch off a regional arms race. That said, a carrier would be useless to Beijing in any effort to reintegrate Taiwan into China by force, which may mean that Beijing is signaling its commitment to peaceful reunification. Worth reading in full. On Saturday, Galrahn posted a piece on Information Dissemination which noted that a story run in the Japanese paper Asahi Shimbun that China intends to build two 50,000- to 60,000-ton conventional propulsion carriers in Shanghai by 2015. Also worth a gander. The upshot is that the move toward carrier capability is likely with an eye to regional concerns, though I am unclear on how, exactly, China means to obtain them.

8. David Jolly and Julia Werdigier at the New York Times reports that in a press conference in Londong Aleksandr I. Medvedev, a deputy chief executive of Gazprom, said, "The flow [of natural gas] to Europe through the Ukraine is now about seven times less than the norm and the situation continues to deteriorate." He said that Gazprom was ready to go to the negotiating table at any time and called upon Europe to "go after Ukraine." Russia has accused Ukraine of siphoning off gas meant for delivery to Europe and has decided to reduce supply through the pipeline by the amount it figures has been siphoned. Philip P. Pan at the Washington Post reports that Bulgaria is preparing to restart a shuttered nuclear reactor as two cities were left without natural gas for heating in freezing weather, given Bulgaria's total dependence on Russian gas delivered via Ukraine. (These ongoing disputes may well yet convince Berlin to do a turnabout on its policy of zero nuclear power.) Of the eastern European nations, Bulgaria historically has been close to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Verena Peternell at Platts reports that petroleum product futures on ICE have climbed substantially on the geopolitical situation in Gaza and the Russo-Ukrainian natural gas dispute.

"The January ICE gasoil futures contract was $36.25 higher on the day at $515/mt, trading above the $500/mt for the first time since December 15, fueled by cold weather across Europe and the gas dispute."

Gasoil is the term in Europe used for heating oil which has very similar characteristics to diesel. $515/mt roughly corresponds to $69.59/b or $1.66/gallon. Front month heating oil is trading at about $1.6263/gallon on NYMEX as I write.

9. Thomas R. Keene and Whitney Kisling at Bloomberg report that Robert Feldman, head of economic research at Morgan Stanley Japan in Tokyo, told Bloomberg TV that he expected the yen to head to 85 to the dollar, perhaps even stronger, by the Summer.

"Feldman said the yen’s real effective exchange rate is not as strong as current market rates may suggest. The rate, a measure of its value against the currencies of 15 of Japan’s trading partners after adjustment for inflation, rose 5.1 percent in December from a month earlier to the highest level since November 2001, the Bank of Japan said today in Tokyo."

10. Reuters reports that eurozone inflation dropped to an annual rate of 1.6% in December, down from 2.1% in November. The European Central Bank target inflation rate is just under 2%.

"'It makes it even more likely for the ECB to cut interest rates further in the next few months, starting in January and going to 1.5 percent in March,' said Holger Schmieding, co-head of Europe economics at Bank of America. 'Next week, the cut will probably be 50 basis points.'"

11. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at the Telegraph UK argues that central banks everywhere will do everything they can to combat debt deflation, including Germany.

"The geopolitical landscape will look different. Cohesive states with a rule of law and old democracies – the Anglosphere, Holland, France, Scandies – will muddle through. They will start to enjoy a political premium in investor psychology, despite horrendous debts.

Obama's America will shine. The country will reemerge as undisputed top dog, the only one with real demographic, scientific, and strategic depth. As first into the crisis, it will be the first to hit bottom. Those expecting the dollar to collapse will have to wait.

The damage to core Europe will take longer, but run deeper. Belgium will face a break-up scare. Markets will test highdebt states as they try to roll over bonds – €200bn (£191bn) for Italy and €40bn for Greece. Spain's corporate debts will turn bad.

Germany's economy will contract by 3pc as exports collapse, and the delayed effects of the strong euro and tight money feed through."

Evans-Pritchard argues that analysts will be shocked by the depth of the downturn in Asia, the Russia will become more totalitarian in the face of below $50/b oil, and that authoritarian states generally will turn toward repression as their promises of growth falter. In the end, he argues everyone will be convinced that the reflation caused by the central banks is just as dangerous as the deflation they averted. Worth reading in full. David Hale in the Financial Times argues that every country will want to avoid an appreciating currency and thus will be forced to finance the American stimulus and financial stabilization program. He thinks that there will be a flocking to precious metals as investors begin to suspect, as Evans-Pritchard thinks will happen at the end of 2009, that inflation will be the policy choice of hugely indebted nations. Also worth reading in full.

12. Eurotintelligence reports that wage inflation is receding in Spain, the average rate was 4.1% in 2008, and the rate in December was 1.5%.

13. Andrew Sullivan in the Daily Dish links to an interview of General Petreaus in Foreign Policy where they asked whether the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are fundamentally different from earlier wars. He says that the current counter-insurgency operations are different in that

a) the internet is new, and thus control over information distribution is impossible and recruitment prevention complicated,
b) the use of suicide bombing has much increased, and
c) the religious component of these conflicts is much enhanced as compared to earlier counterinsurgency campaigns which mostly faced nationalist opposition.

14. Paul Krugman notes that in a survey conducted by the Wall Street Journal of economists between November 7-10, unemployment will reach 8.1% by the end of 2009 and peak in 2010 at 8.4%. Some time has passed since then. The average prediction for first half consumer inflation was 0%, with the majority of economists predicting slight deflation (between -0.1% and -0.7%). The average of predictions for second half consumer inflation is 1.5%. The average GDP growth expectation for 2009 is 0%, though there is quite a range of expectations. The WSJ survey results can be found here.

15. Kelly Evans at the Wall Street Journal reports that American families are saving again, which is hurting the economy. Calculated Risk reports that credit indicators are showing signs of recovery:

# The yield on 3 month treasuries has increased to 0.08%. I suppose this is an improvement (better than zero).

# The three month LIBOR has decreased to 1.42%. The three-month LIBOR rate peaked (for this cycle) at 4.81875% on Oct. 10. (improved)

# The TED spread is at 1.34, sharply lower. (improved)

# The A2P2 spread has plunged to 1.92%. This peaked at 5.86 after Thanksgiving. (better).

# The two year swap spread from Bloomberg: 77.75. (Improved)

Worth reading in full.

16. David Jolly and Jack Healy at the New York Times report that today:

"The Institute for Supply Management’s services sector index rose to 40.6 in December from 37.3 in November as the sector contracted less slowly. Orders to factories declined 4.6 percent in November, nearly double the 2.5 percent drop economists expected, for a record fourth consecutive month in November, and the National Association of Realtors said that pending home sales fell 4 percent to 82.3 from a downwardly revised October reading of 85.7."

17. Yves Smith reports that over 150 hedge funds are limiting redemptions--or the amount of their investment that investors in the funds can redeem. This includes some of the most renowned, like Citadel, Tudor, and Cerberus. That sure is a nice trick, ain't it? Either way, it would seem to telegraph further forthcoming pain in the securities markets.

Daily Sources 12/22

1. Robert Lindsay at the London Times reports that the Ernst & Young ITEM Club expects China's economy to be the world's largest within a decade, due to the credit crunch.

"Brazil, Russia, India and China, the “Bric” nations, will account for 40 per cent of global economic growth between next year and 2020, according to ITEM. Of this, China will account for a quarter."

I cannot help but be just a tad snarky about the credibility of accounting corporations these days, as in, oh, an accounting company said so, its account thus must have a likelihood of coming to pass of, oh, say, precisely zero. How's that for a number?

2. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at the UK Telegraph reports that a variety of countries have begun to raise tariffs in response to the financial crisis. Russia has imposed 30% import tariffs on cars, 15% on agircultural equipment and 95% on poultry imports.

"'It is possible during the financial crisis to support domestic producers by raising customs duties,' said Premier Vladimir Putin. ... India and Vietnam have imposed steel tariffs. Indonesia is resorting to special 'licenses' to choke off imports."

In the meantime, China has moved towards subsidizing its steel industry and appears to be maintaining its currency peg to the dollar, as opposed to allowing the renminbi to appreciate. Anthony Faiola and Glenn Kessler at the Washington Post have a similar story--if less alarmist--which notes that Argentina and Brazil are seeking to raise tariffs on a wide variety of products, and that France is providing its sovereign wealth fund with additional monies to prevent the foreign takeover of "strategic" industries. Faiola and Kessler note that on Friday the US announced it was going to take China to task within the WTO framework for providing illegal subsidies to its export sector. Robert Samuelson in the Washington Post notes that much of the fiscal stimulus coordination between the major industrialized and developing economies is mostly for the press releases.

"Countries agree on broad principles but then go their separate ways. Germany's 'stimulus' program, for instance, is much smaller than the one apparently planned by the Obama administration. Countries renounce protectionism, but there are signs that China -- with a massive trade surplus -- might relax its policy of currency appreciation. By making the yuan cheaper, China would give its exports an added price advantage. If the United States inserted "Buy American" provisions in any stimulus legislation, it, too, would be embracing economic nationalism."

Yves Smith provides her own analysis, which more or less concludes that many nations have begun instituting beggar thy neighbor policies. All four pieces are worth reading in full.

3. Li Yanping and Kevin Hamlin at Bloomberg report that China has cut its benchmark interest rate by 27 basis points (0.27%) to 5.31%. This is the fifth time Beijing has cut its benchmark interest rate in three months.

4. Martin Fackler at the New York Times reports that Toyota announced that it expects an operating loss of ¥150 billion (~ $1.7 billion) for the fiscal year ending March 31. This is the first operating loss Toyota would experience in its 70 year history.

5. Yuriy Humber and Torrey Clark at Bloomberg report that many of the so-called "oligarchs" in Russia are approaching the government for bridge loans to weather the financial crisis.

"More than 100 business leaders are vying for loans from Putin and the administration of President Dmitry Medvedev because Russian companies have about $110 billion of foreign obligations due next year, according to the central bank, double the total owed in Brazil, India and China."

The government is taking voting shares and requiring representatives on corporate boards in return for capitalization. Many of the corporations will therefore revert to state control. Well worth reading in its entirety.

6. Lucian Kim at Bloomberg reports that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will personally open the next meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Moscow tomorrow. Many worry about the GCEF as a new OPEC, but there are too many differences between natural gas and oil business realities for GCEF to really have the same kind of influence on the market as OPEC does. (I might write something explaining this further later.) In any case, the members of GCEF include Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia (which may soon cease to be a natural gas exporter), Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad & Tobago, the UAE, and Venezuela. Norway and Equatorial Guinea both have observer status with the organization. It's website can be found here.

7. Sam Fletcher at the Oil & Gas Journal reports that in a report for the London Energy Meeting, Cambridge Energy Research Associates wrote that the global oil market is being hit hard by a global "recession shock."

"At the start of this year, some analysts estimated global demand growth as high as 2.1 million b/d. CERA's current global demand estimate for 2008 is a 300,000 b/d decline and for 2009, an additional 660,000 b/d drop. 'The last time demand dropped this much was in the deep recession of 1981,' it said."

The report also appears to claim that the oil markets have been in the grip of unprecedented price volatility in 2008, which is odd given my recent analysis of front month price volatility which showed, for example, more instances of 5% price moves in front month oil in 1986 than I had seen so far in 2008. (see Spot Life CL Jan 09 pt 2, which was posted on 12/11.) I'll take a look at the data again, but I don't think my last account is much off. Mathew Carr at Bloomberg writes that the CERA report stresses that more data transparency would do much to smooth the price volatility we see in the oil markets.

"I think it would be hard to find anyone who would disagree with that. A US Securities Exchange Commission redefinition of reserves may prove to be a model for the world, [Daniel] Yergin said. 'The definition of reserves for financial reporting purposes needs to be updated.'"

I think it would be hard to find anyone who would openly disagree with that, but, it was just recently that Russia was reported to have delayed the introduction of more transparent oil reserves data accounting methods. (see Daily Sources 12/16 #1) The reasons that producing countries have an interest in opacity need to be better explored, clearly, as they do not appear to be especially anxious to provide it. Just saying following Western accounting "best practices" does not have much persuasive power these days given the obvious lack of credibility the Western accounting powerhouses have in pretty much every market sector they happen to cover.

8. Richard Meade at Lloyd's List writes that increased transparency is currently being considered by the shipping industry as a way to combat chronic woes.

9. John Kingston at the Platts blog "The Barrel," notes

"In its monthly report this week, OPEC said OECD stocks currently stand at 56.3 days of forward cover, about four days more than the average for the past five years. But given the steepness of virtually all forward curves for crude and major products, and given antecdotal reports from individual markets, it's tough to find anybody who really believes that number. Almost everyone believes it is much higher. It's that number that will keep oil depressed for the foreseeable future, unless just about every barrel of OPEC's cuts takes hold."

Steve Gelsi at Marketwatch has the related story that oil stored at Cushing, Oklahoma, is approaching the record level of 28 million barrels set earlier this year. (h/t reader trexbean) Given the huge contango, it seems that folks in the market are having a hard time financing storage deals but that all available storage is about to be gone even with such difficulties.

10. The AFP reports that on Sunday it interviewed a PKK spokesman and, in it, he openly worried about Ankara's relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq.

"'Since they failed in their military campaign in the border region over the past year, they have come up with the policy of trying to divide the Kurds and provoke infighting among them,' Kamal Kheyri told AFP by telephone."

(h/t informed comment)

11. The BBC reported that the Iraqi Parliament on Saturday rejected the draft law which would have allowed coalition forces not covered by the Status of Forces Agreement, ie everyone but the US, to remain in Iraq beyond 2008. The Parliament in effect called for individual agreements with each coalition member. The al-Maliki cabinet has until the new year to craft a new bill and get it through Parliament or there will be no legal mandate for the British presence there. Somewhat ironic given the English media's response to the blanket legislation, considering the fact that the UK did not have an individual agreement a "national humiliation." (see Daily Sources 12/15 #11)

12. Ernesto Londoño at the Washington Post reports that the al-Maliki government is threatening to expel from Iraq members of the anti-Iranian opposition fighters--or terrorists, depending on your point of view--group the MEK. There are about 3,500 Iranian members of the MEK residing in a refugee camp, more or less, in northern Iraq. The US State Department designated them a terrorist group some time ago. Danny Postel provides some links to neoconservative support for the MEK over the years, including Daniel Pipes, David Horowitz, Max Boot, and Patrick Clawson. If I remember correctly, Pipes was involved in a controversy a few years ago when he was to speak at an MEK rally to be held openly in Washington, DC.

13. Thomas Erdbrink at the Washington Post reports that on Sunday police in Tehran shut down the office of Shirin Ebadi's human rights organization. The article is well worth reading in full.

"In a telephone interview, Ebadi called the closure of her organization's office 'illegal' and "unacceptable." She vowed to reopen the center, saying that 'the police actions are against the law.'"

The fact that the government is going out of its way to impede the operation of Ebadi is important because it shows that Tehran regards this human rights lawyer as a significant threat to the credibility of the regime. It is just as important that the reason given is that Ebadi's organization did not possess the appropriate license for operations in Tehran, that is, the government is using "the letter of the law" to oppose, in Ebadi's view, the spirit of it. I go into great length about the unique vulnerability of the Islamic regimes to a disregard for rule of law in a piece I wrote in April, Law and Revolution in Iran.

14. Stephanie McCrummen has an interesting account of conditions in Somalia. As the situation deteriorates, many apparently feel they have no choice but to join one militant group or another. In this case, mostly al-Shabaab. Worth reading.

15. Nicholas Winning at Real Time Economics reports that the European Union’s Eurostat statistics agency released figures today showing that in October new industrial orders in the eurozone fell 4.7% on the month and 15.1% on the year. This is the worst decline seen since records were first kept in 1997. Also,

"The Belgian National Bank [released the results of a survey today with] its main confidence index [plunging] to -31.3 from -23.7 in November. The drop was most noticeable in the manufacturing sector, where confidence fell to -36.5 from -27.1."

16. Bloomberg reports that the Irish government announced a plan to recapitalize its three largest domestic banks by purchasing preferred shares and underwriting the issue of further shares in the companies. The government will take a controlling stake in Anglo Irish Bank Corporation with preferred shares representing 75% of the corporation's voting rights in return for an investment of €1.5 billion (~ $2.087 billion). Dublin will pay €2 billion (~ $2.783 billion) each for preferred shares with voting rights in Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland. "Irish financial shares have fallen on average 92% this year, led by Anglo Irish, which has plunged 97%." You'll recall that Ireland began a sort of race toward upping state insurance of domestic financial institutions, thus putting their European financial competition at a disadvantage, in late September early October, presaging the disunity in the European fiscal response to the financial crisis seen of late. (see Daily Sources 10/6 #1)

17. David Smith at the London Times reports that revised third quarter GDP figures for the UK will be released this week showing a contraction of at least 0.5%.

"The Centre for Economics and Business Research, a consultancy, predicts that Britain will contract by 3% in 2009 and a further 0.7% in 2010, implying a long, deep recession.

Capital Economics, another consultancy, now predicts a fall of 2.5% in GDP next year, with a further drop of 1% during 2010.

This compares with the Treasury’s prediction of a decline in GDP of between 0.7% and 1.25% next year, followed by a recovery in 2010, when it expects to see the economy grow by between 1.5% and 2%."

18. George Soros, writing for the interesting non-profit organization--the Project Syndicate--makes the following observation:

"The US consumer can no longer serve as the motor of the world economy. To avoid a global depression other countries must also stimulate their domestic economies. But periphery countries without large export surpluses are not in a position to employ countercyclical policies. It is up to the IMF to find ways to finance countercyclical fiscal deficits. This could be done partly by enlisting sovereign wealth funds and partly by issuing Special Drawing Rights so that rich countries that can finance their own fiscal deficits could cede to poorer countries that cannot."

He also has a sort of neo-Kantian notion of the markets, saying that they do not honestly reflect the conditions of the organizations in which they invest. Worth reading.

19. Matthew Brown at Bloomberg reports that the TED spread--the difference between what banks and the US government pay to borrow money--has dropped to below 150 basis points (1.5%) for the first time since the demise of Lehman Brothers. The indicator suggests that interbank lending has not increased as a result of the financing efforts of various governments.

20. Fareed Zakaria has an opinion piece in today's Washington Post which says, in tones laden with hysteria, that, for Obama to have done his job well, he will have to "do nothing less than rescue capitalism." I tend to like Zakaria's analyses, which are generally extremely well informed, nuanced, and sly. This piece, however, suggests that Zakaria should take a break from the press and its sensationalist ways. The troubles we face are serious, indeed, and require measured un-sensational, in short serious, analysis. There is no need to deify the moment any further. You can almost hear the ghost of Heidegger chuckling in the wings.

Law and Revolution in Iran

Following up on my last blog on the lawyers revolt in Pakistan, I thought it might be interesting to take a look at the theocracy in Iran. Lawyers in that country are using the legal framework of that country to challenge the government's abuses of authority. Why? Given that it is a totalitarian state, what would be the point? I conclude that by taking seriously the rights established by the Constitution in Iran the lawyers are pursuing a threat that could eventually establish a more open and amicable state. And that conclusion suggests an entirely different approach to dealing with Iran than any I have encountered before.

"The law is the will of he who the sherriff will obey." -- Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

"In Islam, the legislative power and competence to establish laws belong exclusively to God Almighty." -- Leader of the Revolution Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini

SHIRIN EBADI

Last week, Shirin Ebadi, nobel laureate, prominent human rights activist and constitutional lawyer in Iran complained that the death threats against her and her family had recently increased in volume and intensity.(1) The very next day the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ordered the police to ensure the security of Mrs. Ebadi and get to the bottom of who was behind the trouble.(2) On the same day, the chief of police of Tehran was arrested after being caught at a brothel--this was a man who instigated a crackdown on immodestly dressed women just last year.(3)

Mrs. Ebadi is no friend to the current regime in Iran. She was one of the first female judges in that country and was forced to step down when the revolution took place. She is a prominent activist who has pushed for women's rights in that country as well as taken the cases of many dissidents--and as a result has been imprisoned many times. She is a reformer, who believes that the general principles of universal human rights are compatible with Islamic doctrine. She believes that the current regime has perverted the message of Islam for their own ends.(4)

Why, you might ask, would the revanchiste administration of Iran expend valuable manpower and cash on protecting one of their most prominent opponents? Part of the answer is that it would be extremely embarrassing if one of the most celebrated children of Iran were assassinated. Probably best not to let that happen. But I believe there is something else going on here, a process which has similarities to the ongoing lawyers revolt in Pakistan that I wrote about in my last blog.

LAW AND THE SHIA STATE

The Iranian government is probably unique in that it has so many institutions responsible for the making and interpretation of laws. It is almost certainly unique in that the Constitution provides for a legal authority superior to itself, the Koran--and thereby extends legal authority to people outside the government and even outside the country itself!

As I pointed out in my previous blog, one of the key preoccupations of Islam is the establishment of a rules-based society. The Koran and various other texts are consulted by clerics in order to determine what is permissable in just about every facet of life. Legal decision-making, interpretation, and argument is central to the life of a Muslim cleric.

One of the contentious doctrines of Shi'a jurisprudence is the guardianship of the Islamic Jurists or Velayat-e Faqih.(5) There are various takes on the doctrine, but it dates back to the 19th century and has as one of its doctrinal premises a hadith(6)--a recorded saying of prophet Muhammad which is not in the Koran--which states "the fuqaha [experts in Islamic jurisprudence](7) are the trustees of the prophets."(8)

This doctrine is the very bedrock of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 1970, Ruhollah Khomenei's book Islamic Government: Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Hokumat-e Islami: Velayat-e faqih) was published arguing that the country's ruler should be someone who "surpasses all others in knowledge" of Islamic law and justice.(9)

And that is what was the revolution established in Iran. Chapter VIII, Article 110, of the Constitution ordained that the Leader of the Revolution (aka Supreme Leader)(10) would have very broad powers over pretty much every element of the government.(11)

This sounds totalitarian. And indeed it is.

The Iranian Constitution is modeled in many ways on the constitution of the Fifth Republic of France, which was created under de Gaulle in order to give more power to the executive.(12) It gives some lip service to rights generally established in Western Democracies, but nearly all of these rights are limited by whether or not they are in accordance with Islamic principles. Chapter III, article 40, provides that:

No one is entitled to exercise his rights in a way injurious to others or detrimental to public interests.(13)

Of course, the government decides what is in the public interest and so decides when it is OK to exercise your Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

However, there are some meaningful checks and balances written into the Iranian Constitution--and they all have to do with who gets to decide what is in accordance with Islamic law and custom.

There are no fewer than five institutions within the Iranian government that are charged with determining the law.

One: The Legislature, also known as the Majlis or the Islamic Consultative Assembly, which is democratically-elected and charged with writing the laws of the land.

Two: The "head of the Judiciary," who must be a Mujtahid--or Islamic scholar competent to interpret divine law in practical situations(14)--and is appointed by the Leader of the Revolution for a five year term. He is charged with the appointment of judges, their promotion or demotion, the drafting of judiciary bills, and the organizational structure of the judiciary as a whole. It should be noted that the judiciary is also charged with investigating as well as prosecuting criminal behavior, in conjunction with the Executive. The head of the judiciary also runs the National General Inspectorate, which is charged with ensuring the "correct implementation of laws" by the Administration.(15)

Three: the Supreme Court, which is responsible for overseeing "the correct implementation of the laws by the courts" and "ensuring uniformity of judicial procedure." The Chief Justice of the Iranian Supreme Court is chosen by the head of the judiciary in consultation with the members of the court.(16) One is appointed a member of the Supreme Court by the head of the judiciary--not by the Leader nor the President.

Four: the Guardian Council, which is charged with determining whether any bill passed by the Majlis is compatible "with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution."(17) There are 12 members of the Guardian Council. Six fuqaha, or experts in Islamic jurisprudence, are selected by the Leader of the Revolution. Six are jurists, experts in various spheres of the law, elected by the Majlis, subject to approval by the Head of the Judiciary. Members serve six year terms.

A bill submitted by the Majlis must pass by majority vote of the six religious jurisprudential experts (fuqaha) in the Guardian Council if it is to be deemed compatible with Islam and thus enacted into law. For a bill to be deemed compatible with the Constitution, a majority of all members of the Council is required.(18) Furthermore, all "interpretation" of the Constitution is the sole province of the Guardian Council, where a three-fourths majority is required in order to pass as authoritative.(19) (Moreover, the Guardian Council supervises all elections and referenda, and determines the eligibility of all candidates for elective office.)(20)

Five: the Exigency Council (aka Expediency Discernment Council), which is responsible for resolving any situation where the Guardian Council and Majlis disagree and the Leader of the Revolution feels it necessary to call them in to decide the dispute. The Exigency Council is wholly appointed by the Leader of the Revolution.(21)

There are two other governmental institutions which, I think, must also be considered important authorities determining the law of the land in Iran.

The Leader of the Revolution is responsible for "deliniating the general policies of the government and has the power to summarily dismiss the Head of the Judiciary and the six fuqaha members of the Guardian Council.

The Assembly of Experts is responsible for determining who will be the next Leader of the Revolution and may, given the right circumstances, dismiss him.(22) Theoretically, this could mean that the Assembly oversees the Leader in some way, but there is no evidence of such oversight on public record. Its 86 members are democratically elected to eight year terms, after candidates have been vetted by the Guardian Council.(23)

Depending on how you see it, then, in Iran there are five to seven different governmental authorities empowered to determine the law. None is truly independent of all the others, though the Leader and the Assembly of Experts are nearly completely autonomous.

Although the Leader has a great amount of indirect influence over official legal interpretation, he is not, in fact, directly involved in law making or even its interpretations. All of this work is delegated or in the hands of elected officials. This might seem strange, given the character of the revolutionary constitution.

But in practical terms, at the time of the Revolution, it made no difference. Ayatolla Ruholla Khomeini had pretty much unchallenged authority to interpret the Koran inside Iran itself.

Indeed, Khomeini is the only person in the history of Iran to be referred as an Imam outside of what have been traditionally considered the twelve rightful successors to Muhammad.

Imams in Shi'a belief "are possessed of supernatural knowledge, authority, and freedom from any error and sin."(24)

And this, I think, is the key to the puzzle: the reason Khomeini was comfortable delegating the power to interpret these laws is because he had reason to believe he would remain in complete control of the situation.

His power was safeguarded by the Constitution, and especially in Article 2:

The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:
1.the One God (as stated in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;
2.Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws;(25)

Khomeini said it all in 1979: "`since I have appointed [the Prime Minister], he must be obeyed.` It was `God's government,` he warned, disobedience against which was a `revolt against God.`"(26)

But the current Leader of the Revolution Ali Khamenei does not weild this religious authority. Far from it. And thus the Constitutional structure does not support his overweening influence over the affairs of the country in the way it did Khomeini.

REVOLUTION AND COMPROMISE

Khomeini's notion of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist is actually fairly controversial in the Shia community. At the time of the Revolution only one other Grand Ayatolla in Iran (out of about 12) held it to be compatible with scripture: Grand Ayatolla Hossein Ali Montazeri.(27)

And Montazeri was Khomeini's original choice as successor to the post of the Leader of the Revolution. In 1983, the Assembly of Experts designated him the official successor. But Montazeri fell out with Khomeini, and in particular criticized the government for the executions carried out after the Revolution as well as Khomeini's death warrant for Salman Rushdie. In 1989, Khomeini denounced Montazeri who thus lost his position as designated successor.(28)

The current Leader of the Revolution--Ayatolla Seyyed Hosseini Khamenei--did not have the religious credentials originally required by the Iranian Constitution for the highest post.(29) He only attained the title of Ayatolla--not Grand Ayatolla--by virtue of being elected Leader.(30) In fact, the Constitution was amended three months before Grand Ayatolla Ruhollah Khomeini's death to no longer require a candidate for the post of Leader of the Revolution be a supreme theological authority.(31) And Khamenei's selection caused some dissention amongst senior clerics who were better qualified from a religious perspective, including, unsurprisingly, Montazeri.(32)

Khamenei was a compromise candidate and his ascention was due to his political perspicacity and not his religious authority. This has created a situation where, at least theoretically, there are many authorities on the Koran who could make actions by the government unconstitutional, merely by ruling them contrary to the Koran. A strange situation to be in indeed.

At this moment, such a ruling from inside the country would likely be met with immediate arrest and character assassination in the state press. Any Ayatolla who in the sanctum of his conscience believes that the state has overstepped the bounds of Islamic Law must, perforce, walk quietly. Khamenei is firmly in charge there.

But there are Grand Ayatollas that live outside of Iran--beyond the long arm of the law, so to speak.

IRAN AND THE OTHER

It bears repeating that Iranians hold the United States responsible for the installation of the Shah and the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953. The Revolution in 1979 was in a way a revolution against the American colonizer, the Shah being seen as a mere proxy for the US.

Moreover, many Iranians believe that the United States was a strong supporter an instigator of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, where the Iranians lost an estimated one million people.(33) In any case, although I can only offer anecdotal evidence of this, to a great extent Iranians blame their historical woes on the pernicious efforts of outsiders--from the Arab invasion of the 7th century to the colonizing efforts of Britain, Russia, and ultimately, in their view, of the United States.

It was an explicit goal of the Revolution in 1979 to rid Iran of just such outside influences. For example, Article 3 of the Iranian Constitution stipulates that "the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing all its resources to the following goals," goal five is "the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence" and goal 13 is "the attainment of self-sufficiency in scientific, technological, industrial, agricultural, and military domains, and other similar spheres."(34)

The first two sentences of Article 9 hold that:

"In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and their preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens. No individual, group, or authority, has the right to infringe in the slightest way upon the political, cultural, economic, and military independence or the territorial integrity of Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom."(35)

There are no less than 12 articles and sections of the Constitution concerned with eliminating and preventing outside influence.(36) This indicates to me a certain preoccupation with the issue.

I think it is clear that currently Iranians feel that they are in the crosshairs of a powerful outside influence--the United States.
A recent survey by WorldPublicOpinion.org which polled Iranian citizens on a variety of subjects found that 64% of Iranian respondents thought the United States was purposefully trying "to humiliate" the Islamic world. 55% believe that US bases in the Middle East are a threat to Iran. (This number is down from December 2006, when 73% had that perception--perhaps because it is widely perceived that American power has been depleted by our involvement in Iraq.)(37) 71% think it is "definitely" America's goal "to maintain control over the oil resources of the Middle East."(38) 65% of Iranians believe that the United States controls "most" or "nearly all" of the world.(39)

In other words, "the Great Satan" controls most or nearly all of the world. Not an ideal situation.

This might explain the rather high levels of support for the government the survey found in Iran. When asked whether they were satisfied with the direction the country was going in, 65% of Iranians were.(40) 74% of Iranians apparently trust the national government to do "what is right." 64% of Iranians are satisfied with Iran's foreign relations. 63% responded that they thought President Amadinejad had improved Iran's overall national security!(41)

One would be forgiven for having some misgivings about the responses to such highly charged questions in a poll conducted in a country where frank opposition to the government is unsafe. Nonetheless, this is the data we have, and even if you discount a portion of the responses, it does seem that there is widespread support for the government and its policies--much more than any government is likely to require to perpetuate itself.

So while it may be that the Iranian Revolution has betrayed most of its promises, the Iranians may well feel inclined to express strong support for their government as the most capable of resisting foreign domination--and when the meddling of foreigners needs to be dealt with immediately. That would be my guess, in any case.

IRAQ

There has been a lot of ink spilled on how the invasion of Iraq has created a "shi'ite crescent," increasing Iran's influence via their solidarity and credibility with the Shia's of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf nations.(42) Perhaps this is so, but the influence can potentially go in both directions.

Grand Ayatolla Ali Sistani is the most prominent Shia cleric in Iraq, based in Najaf.(43) Najaf is a particularly important city in terms of Iran for two reasons: it is the home of the Imam Ali Mosque, the third holiest site in Shia Islam, and it is where Ruholla Khomeini spent most of his time in exile from the Shah's regime. It is where he wrote Islamic Government: Authority of the Jurist.(44)

There is a long tradition of dissent in Shi'a Islam, and, Najaf has been at points in its history one of its foci. In fact, Ali Sistani is a much more highly regarded religious authority than the current Leader of the Revolution in Iran, Ali Khamenei. And Grand Ayatolla Ali Sistani is on the record as ruling that the concept of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist as it is expressed in Iran is contrary to his understanding of Islam.(45)

Ali Sistani--like most Iraqi clerics--is extremely uncomfortable with the US presence in Iraq and does not want to be associated with the United States in any way.(46) I think it is fair to say that any association with the United States would taint his reputation. Also, as long as the United States is in Iraq, Iran remains a powerful counterbalance to our influence there--something that Sistani likely considers useful.

But this is also tricky business for the Iranians. For example, in the recent fighting between the Mahdi Army and US (and Iraqi government) forces, the Iranians backed the Iraqi government--and by extension the US.(47) The Mahdi Army is led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who is also on record as being against the Iranian expression of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. His version of an Islamic government would to all intents and purposes gut the role of the supreme religious authority.(48) Sadr is the head of an effective military force in Iraq--unlike Sistani--and studying to be an Ayatollah (he is currently just an Hojatoleslam(49), or what the Ali Khamenei's religious rank was just prior to his elevation to Leader.) And though it is much more complicated than that, I see why Iran would be uncomfortable with the rise of another religious authority next door who happened to be in charge of a military organization and explicitly against their form of government.

Ali Sistani would in some ways be more of a concern to me were I in charge of Iran. If Iraq were to stabilize and his influence grew, his interpretations could be seen as a challenge to the constitutionality of the Iranian Constitution itself. There have been unsubstantiated rumors of assassination attempts on Sistani's life. If one were to ask who benefits from such a deed, there are a number of answers, but it ain't the US, and Iran potentially would.

Either way, there are plenty of religious authorities in Iraq, and the view generally held in Najaf is contrary to the Khomeini interpretation of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. They have credibility in Iran. And if the US were to leave Iraq, this credibility could grow. And if the guy the sherriff in Iran will obey ends up being a cleric in Iraq--as in 1979--then the government in Iran has a real problem. After all, there are already significant religious authorities in Iran, like Montazeri, who are against Khomeini's interpretation of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.

REVOLUTION COMPROMISED

And the fact of the credibility of religious authorities in Iraq is a problem for Iran, not just because the Leader of the Revolution has less, but because the Iranian Revolution, like most, cannot make good on its many and various promises.

It promises a lot.

It promises equal rights, regardless of color or sex.(50) The investigation into a person's personal beliefs is forbidden.(51) Freedom of expression is guaranteed.(52) Freedom of association is as well.(53) Social security, free education, and housing are all guaranteed.(54) Innocence is presumed, the right to a fair trial and counsel affirmed, and torture is prohibited by the Iranian Constitution.(55)

There are many more. And as I pointed out above, most of these rights are qualified with exceptions which provide for instances where the law can curtail these privleges. The Iranian government has made good use of those qualifiers. But, there is another important protection in sentence three, Article 9 of the Constitution:

"no authority has the right to abrogate legitimate freedoms, not even by enacting laws and regulations for that purpose, under the pretext of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the country. "(56)

The Iranian government has arguably done that ... more than once. And this particular article is unalterable under the current Constitution.

PROMISES MATTER

Why would the Byzantine intricacies of Shi'a theology and law make any difference on the ground in Iran?

The history of the US might be a useful guide. Our own revolution declared as self-evident that all men are created equal. Of course, the US Constitution was a compromise which allowed for the slavery of a portion of the human race. And the movement which cried out most bitterly about the contraditions therein was originally and primarily a religious movement, led by Quakers and refreshed by the Great Awakening in the 1830s.(57)

William Garrison, the most celebrated abolitionist of his time, is said to have called the Constitution a "covenant with death and an agreement with hell." Here was his argument in his own words:

"No body of men ever had the right to guarantee the holding of human beings in bondage. Who or what were the framers of our government, that they should dare confirm and authorize such high-handed villany – such a flagrant violation of all the precepts and injunctions of the gospel — such a savage war upon a sixth of our whole population? —They were men, like ourselves – as fallible, as sinful, as weak, as ourselves. By the infamous bargain which they made between themselves, they virtually dethroned the Most High God, and trampled beneath their feet their own solemn and heaven-attested Declaration, that all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights ...."(58)

It is clear that it was a powerfully effective argument. And, after all, that was a great part of the justification of the Iranian Revolution in the first place, the Shah's compact with us--"the Great Satan." I think they ignore such contradictions at their own risk.

From my distant remove, that is what I think Mrs. Shirin Ebadi and her ilk are up to. They may provide some credibility to the regime by taking their promises seriously, but it is by seriously exploring the contradictions within the Constitution and its application by the government, that dissenters are able to undermine the credibility of the regime itself. Efforts by the regime to reconcile the Constitution with the needs of the day will make for more and more convoluted compromises. It is a slow process. But it is a likely one, and likely inevitable as well.

Just as our Constitution had contradictions that required an eventual shaking out, so does the Constitution of Iran.

WHAT CAN THE US DO?

Proactively? Not much, in my view. Any backing by the US of these efforts in Iran or clerical authorities in Iraq would only undermine the credibility of those we are trying to support. Calls for such efforts are misguided.(59) The US is the third rail of politics in Iran--and probably in Iraq as well. Our favorable ratings throughout the Middle East are--as I pointed out in an earlier blog--very very low. Though we should complain loudly when obvious human rights violations are taking place, we should do as much as possible to maintain a distance from those elements that we believe might produce positive change in Iran.

Furthermore, as long as we are in Iraq and have troops in the Middle East, we are providing the cover that the theocracy in Iran needs to continue as it has. We actually diminish the chances of an outcome of the debate in Iran which is in our interests--and the Middle East generally--by being so directly involved in the affairs of the region simply because we seem threatening.

Obviously, given the energy needs of the US, Europe, India, China, and Japan, American security guarantees are going to be an ongoing concern. But the notion of long-term bases in the region is likely a mistake, given the evolution of the debate there. Germany, Japan, and South Korea were one thing, this is quite another. We would best be served by limiting or getting rid altogether of our military presence in the region.

The exception to this is Afghanistan. We cannot afford to let Afghanistan slip back into chaos or under Taliban control. Interestingly, Iran would likely be a tactical ally in our efforts against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Administration has denied that there has been any cooperation between Iranian and American special forces in Afghanistan, but members of the Iranian parliament have mentioned it(60), and Shias are not regarded as Muslim by the Taliban.(61) My suspicion is that such cooperation has in fact occured. I also suspect that it is difficult territory for the Iranian leadership, as cooperation with "the Great Satan" seems contrary to the whole meaning of the Revolution--and thus should be encouraged!

It has also been suggested that we ought to engage Iran, and try and bring about a "grand bargain."(62) Much as I respect and admire the various realist luminaries, such as Flynt Leverett, Tom Pickering, and others who support the idea, I suspect pursuing one is not likely to be productive. At each moment when the Iranians and the Americans have sat down to talk about this possibility, one side or the other has backed out. As I wrote above, I believe the Iranians need us as adversaries in order to perpetuate their regime ... and any attempted bargain with the United States exposes an Iranian politician to dangerous criticism in Iran itself. I believe it would make more sense to simply agree to talk to the Iranians when they want to, establish an embassy in Tehran should they ask for one, but pursue a wait and see policy where we would only agree to Iranian proposals if there existed clear advantages to us.

I believe that our embargo of Iran should be carefully reconsidered as well. It is likely that the embargo has a negative effect upon the development of the energy industry in Iran. I do not believe that this is in our best interests, as less oil in tight markets means exponentially higher oil prices. Lifting the embargo on Iranian oil wouldn't make much of a change, but allowing for financing may well end up making their industry more productive, which will bring down the price of oil and natural gas somewhat, over the long term.

Moreover, it is not clear to me that trying to weaken the economy in Iran is likely to produce change in the government there. There is the old example of Cuba, which, though it has been subject to an embargo much more effective than any possible with Iran, has safely perpetuated the communist regime for over 50 years.

I think that the J-curve theory of social revolutions is more likely. First proposed by James Davies in 1972, the J-curve theory of social revolutions argues that it is after first an increase in economic well-being which produces certain expectations, and then a political and economic drop in well-being, widening the gap between expectation and reality, that revolutions occur.(63) I expect that such economic well-being, combined with critical evaluation of the Revolution's promise and an absence of a outsider threat to cover the regime's broken promises is the twist of fate we are waiting on. I do not think that the embargo should just be abandoned unilaterally--we should wait on a good opportunity, where we can wrest some advantage from it. But I think it should be on the table.

(1) Iranian Nobel Laureate Complains of Death Threats, RFE/RL Newsline, Tuesday, April 15, 2008, Volume 12, Number 71
(2) Iran's Ahmadinejad orders police to protect Ebadi, AFP, Tue Apr 15, 9:55 AM ET
3) Chief of police for Tehran was arrested, Iran confirms, by Nazila Fathi, International Herald Tribune, April 16, 2008
(4) The Nobel Foundation's Nobel Peace Prize Biography of Shirin Ebadi
(5) Wikipedia: Ja'fari jurisprudence
(6) For a discussion of the Hadith, see Wikipedia: Hadith. Basically they are stories about Prophet Muhammad which were passed down orally until they were finally put to paper two or three hundred years after his death. In a way there are similar to the Apocrypha of Christianity, except that they are regularly and generally consulted as clarifications of the meaning of the Koran and what is therefore halaal, i.e. kosher or permitted, and haraam, that is, forbidden.
(7) Fuqaha is the plural of Faqih--an expert in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), see a discussion of the term at Wikipedia: Faqih and Wikipedia: Fiqh.
(8) Wikipedia: Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists
(9) Wikipedia: Hokumat-e Islami : Velayat-e faqih
(10) Actually in the Constitution the position of the Supreme Leader is referred to as "the Leader of the Revolution" or just plain "Leader." See Wikipedia: Supreme Leader of Iran
(11) from the translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran at International Constitutional Law database hosted by Bern University in Switzerland:

Article 110 [Leadership Duties and Powers]
(1) Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:
1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council.
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda.
4. Assuming supreme command of the Armed Forces.
5. Declaration of war and peace and the mobilization of the Armed Forces.
6. Appointment, dismissal, and resignation of:
a. the religious men on the Guardian Council,
b. the supreme judicial authority of the country,
c. the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
d. the chief of the joint staff,
e. the chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and
f. the supreme commanders of the Armed Forces.
7. Resolving differences between the three wings of the Armed Forces and regulation of their relations.
8. Resolving the problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Nation's Exigency Council.
9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council, and, in the case of the first term of a President, by the Leadership.
10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89.
11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation from the Head of judicial power.

(2) The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person.

(12) My previous piece on Venezuela points out that the party that first brought Chavez to power was known as the "Fifth Republic Movement"--the kinship between Venezuela and Iran is actually a bit deeper than people usually suspect. (Venezuela, of course, was the country behind the establishment of OPEC.)
(13) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, hosted by Iran online.
(14) Wikipedia: Ijtihad
(15) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter XI, Articles 156-8, and 174, hosted by Iran online.
(16) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter XI, Articles 161-4, at International Constitutional Law database hosted by Bern University in Switzerland. (Perhaps due to the amendment of the Constitution in 1989, Iran online's version of the document does not at the moment include Article 163.)
(17) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter VI, Section 2, Article 94, hosted by Iran online.
(18) Article 96
(19) Article 98 (I do not know how this operates in practice, but it is a tremendous amount of authority, theoretically speaking.)
(20) Article 99
(21) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter VIII, Article 112
(22) Article 111
(23) Wikipedia: Assembly of Experts
(24) Wikipedia: Imamah
(25) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter I, Article 1, hosted by Iran online.
(26) Wikipedia: Ruhollah Khomeini
(27) Wikipedia: Ruhollah Khomeini
(28) Wikipedia: Grand Ayatolla Hossein- Ali Montazeri
(29) Reading Khamenei: the World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader, by Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2008, p. 11
(30) Wikipedia: Ali Khamenei
(31) Iran Online: The Leadership
(32) Wikipedia: Ali Khamenei
(33) Wikipedia: Iran-Iraq War
(34) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter I (General Principles), Article 3, hosted by Iran online.
(35) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter I (General Principles), Article 9, hosted by Iran online.
(36) The 9 others are: Article 43, section 8, of the Iranian Constitution holds that insofar as the economy goes, it is the duty of the government to [prevent] "foreign economic domination over the country's economy." Cf: English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter IV.
Article 78 holds that "All changes in the boundaries of the country are forbidden;" Article 81: "The granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden;" and Article 82 "The employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in cases of necessity and with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Cf: (46) English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter VI, Part 2.
Article 145 stipulates that "No foreigner will be accepted into the Army or security forces of the country." Article 146 "The establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for peaceful purposes, is forbidden." Cf: English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter 9, Part 3.
Article 152 states:

"The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers ...."

Article 153 continues with "Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national life, is forbidden." English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter X (Foreign Policy), hosted by Iran online.
(37) Public Opinion in Iran, with comparisons to American Public Opinion, A WorldPublicOpinion.org poll, p. 11, April 7, 2008. The poll was conducted in partnership with Search for Common Ground and Knowledge Networks as well as an unnamed polling firm in Iran. (WorldPublicOpinion.org is a program managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland.)
(38) p. 10
(39) p. 11
(40) p. 18
(41) p. 19
(42) see, for example, Vali Nasr's book: The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, W.W. Norton, April 9, 2007, which I have not read, but understand addresses this issue directly. A google search will yield many other examples.
(43) Wikipedia: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
(44) Wikipedia: Ruhollah Khomeini
(45) "'Shia Democracy': Myth or Reality?", by Sreeram Chaulia, February 16, 2007, Worldpress.org.
(46) "The Grand Ayatollah Behind the Curtain," by Colbert I. King, The Washington Post, Saturday, October 28, 2006; Page A15.
(47) Informed Comment: Iran Supported al-Maliki against Militias: OSC, by Juan Cole, Sunday, April 13, 2008.
(48) "The Shi‘a in the Arab World," Middle East Report Editorial, Volume 242, Spring 2007.
(49) Wikipedia: Muqtada al-Sadr
(50) Articles 19 and 20
(51) Article 23
(52) Article 24
(53) Articles 26 and 27
(54) Articles 29 - 31
(55) Articles 37, 34, 35 and 38, respectively
(56) Article 9
(57) Wikipedia: Abolitionism
(58) The Liberator Files: The Constitution and a Call for Disunion, a collection of items from Garrison's paper in Boston, The Liberator, the selection quoted was printed in 1832.
(59) See for example Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani's suggestions at a recent Hoover Institution event discussing Ahmadinejad and Iran's Nuclear Program.
(60) "Iran helped overthrow Taliban, candidate says," by Barbara Slavin, USA Today, June 9, 2005
(61) Wikipedia: Taliban
(62) "A grand bargain, or else," by Flynt Leverett, International Herald Tribune, Tuesday, June 20, 2006.
(63) Fragilecologies: Davies J-Curve Revisited, by Michael H. Glantz, 27 June 2003.