Daily Sources 9/4

1. Jihadica has a very interesting piece on a report from the Ingush Mujahidin which details successful tactics in their conflict with the Russians. (The Republic of Ingushetia is just between Chechnya and North Ossetia in the Caucasus.)



The report talks of the centralization of the mujahidin efforts in the Caucasus, and, apparently, the Dagestani and Chechen Fronts both released reports recently alluding to the same phenomena. (Dagestan is to the east of Chechnya, on the littoral of the Caspian Sea, just north of Azerbaijan.)



This, in Jihadica's view, means that there might be some credibility in the FSB's (formerly the KGB) warning of imminent al-Qaeda attacks. This underscores my view that Russian interests are much closer to the West's than the press--and several Senators--would have it. Russia has little interest in establishing a precedent for "self-determination" in the region, but also has no interest in establishing a precedent of allowing Russia-identifying groups be attacked, with impunity, by other self-identifying groups, such as Georgians. Russians constitute an ethnic minority in many of the countries in the former Soviet Union and that is a potent political issue that Medvedev and Putin cannot allow to get out of control. For a sense of the ethnolinguistic complexities of the region we're talking about, see the following map:



2. Steven Lee Myers and Alan Cowell at the New York Times write that Cheney has reaffirmed US support for Georgian membership in NATO.

3. David Jolly at the New York Times writes that BP has reached a compromise regarding the leadership of TNK-BP in Russia, where the current CEO would be replaced by the end of the year with a Russian-speaking candidate with extensive Russian business experience. The parties also tentatively agreed to placing 20% of TNK-BP shares in an IPO, pending Moscow's agreement.

4. Alex Lawler at Reuters reports that PFC Energy thinks that pressure is building within OPEC for production quota reduction. (Evidently meeting on Tuesday, September 9, not the 6th, as I've previously noted ... my bad.)

5. Turns out that Brazil has not officially turned down OPEC invite, Brazil's National Energy Policy Council has the final word on the membership, as per BBC.

6. Joshua Partlow and Juan Forero at the Washington Post have an interesting piece on the United States closing a military base in Ecuador. Ecuador recently rejoined OPEC and its current President is a close ally of Chavez's. A war nearly broke out between Colombia and Ecuador--with Venezuela mobilizing its troops for good measure--not so long ago.

7. Bursa Malaysia is set to launch a crude palm oil futures contract denominated in US dollars this Friday, as per Reuters. (Interesting given all the talk of moving away from dollars in the oil and financial industries.)

8. Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism writes that the CFTC appears to believe that oil traders have been under-reporting inventory and tanker information. This is very interesting because the folks that the "anti-speculation" legislation currently under consideration in Congress goes after are the non-commercial players, i.e., the people who do not have to report these numbers. Those players would be the commercial players, those not considered "speculators." Pretty clear this evil speculation rhetoric was nonsense from the beginning, but just so you know.

9. Co-Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party and Pakistani Presidential Candidate Asif Ali Zardari has an op-ed in the Washington Post today. He writes that it is "essential" that the judiciary be reconstituted, but apparently he is against the reinstatement of Supreme Court Chief Justice Chaudry, the rallying point for the lawyers revolution in that country.

10. In a nice bit of irony I missed until just now, the first company to request a release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve due to Gustav as per Christian Schmollinger and Tina Seeley at Bloomberg was Citgo, or PdVSA (Petroleum de Venezuela S.A.). In a moment the DOE must have relished, the USG immediately agreed to help via a release from the SPR. The next day, Citgo lets the DOE know it has met its requirements via other means.

Daily Sources 9/3

1. Juan Cole's Informed Comment links two more pieces on the ongoing conflict between Kurds and al-Maliki in Diyala. Asharq Alawsat's Ma'ad Fayad interviewed Massoud Barzani Monday. (Asharq Alawsat is a pan-Arabic paper based in London.) As Dr. Cole noted, Barzani refers to the al-Maliki government as "totalitarian." Barzani also says of the situation in Diyala that "it is true that it almost reached the point of confrontation." Barzani also refers to an improved relationship with Turkey. The Guardian's Jonathan Steele reports today that Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi forces are "bracing" for a confrontation in the city of Khanaqin in Diyala province.

2. Salman Masood at the New York Times writes that a would be assassin missed the Pakistani Prime Minister--Yousaf Raza Gilani--today.

3. Eric Watkins at the Oil & Gas Journal writes that Iran has invited Brazil to join OPEC, but that Brazil has refused. Evidently, de Silva gave as his reason--outside of the $1 million membership fee--that Brazil has been investing in refining and biofuels in order to become an exporter of products, not crude.

4. Upstream online reports that Saudi Arabia's Khursaniyah oil field is now operational and producing 500 kb/d of oil. The oil field was initially due to start up in December and produces Arab Medium, a medium sour crude with an APIº of 28.5 and 2.85%wtS. 500 kb/d roughly equals 0.5% of world consumption. (That's a lot.)

5. Alonso Soto at Reuters writes that the Ecuadorian oil minister said that Venezuela was going to propose output cuts at the Saturday OPEC meeting, but that Ecuador was going to call for sustaining the current production quotas. Given the close ties and similar interests of Ecuador and Venezuela, I wonder what the difference in the calculus is.

6. Yesterday Venezuela's Chavez and South Africa's Mbeki signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation, according to SAPA. Chavez called upon PetroSA to enter the oil production sector in Venezuela and hailed the agreement as a example of a new South-to-South cooperation and as a way to help reduce fuel and food costs in the southern hemisphere. Apparently a number of different economic and cultural cooperation agreements are being considered by the pair.

7. Gazprom signed an oil and gas exploration deal with Nigeria today, as per the AFP.

8. Reuters' Tom Pfeiffer writes that European governments are becoming alarmed at new Russian appetite for African energy deals. The concern appears to be centered on deals with African members of OPEC, i.e. Libya, Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, and Russia's reported interest in a gas exporting countries coalition organized along the same basic guidelines as OPEC. This is very interesting given China's Africa Policy of 2006.

9. Russia Economy Watch notes in two posts that growth in both the services and manufacturing sectors in Russia slowed in July.

10. Karen De Young in the Washington Post writes that the US today unveiled a $1 billion aid package for Georgia. Vice President Cheney arrives in Tblisi tomorrow.

11. Francis Fukuyama writes one of the better pieces on Russia and the American situation for the Financial Times. (History ain't over. Never thought it was. Glad Francis is on board for that one ... now.)

12. In a strange article by Rebekah Kebede in Reuters, James L. Gallogly, EVP at ConocoPhillips is quoted as saying that refinery utilization rates in the US will be at the recent (85% as opposed to more traditional 90%) utilization rates for the next few years. This doesn't make a lot of sense given that reduced demand is likely to reduce price in the short term, which in the medium term should increase demand and thus price and thus refinery runs. In any case, if it proves true, given that the share of world consumption is about 25%, this will be very significant going forward. Perhaps Gallogly is signalling that Conoco expects a worldwide slump.

13. Brad Setser, whose blog Follow the Money is hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations' Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, writes that demand for GSE debt from foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds is drying up. (Evidently, they have shifted their purchasing to treasuries ... still US.) Given that there is no private appetite for the GSE debt, and that GSEs are the mortgage market in the US, that certainly doesn't bode well. (Maurice Greenberg, of course, is the former CEO & Chairman of AIG and I'm guessing this particular institution at the CFR has been funded, for the most part, by the Starr Foundation--AIG's foundation that gives grants by invitation only. Just thought worth noting given AIG's current troubles and the light this particular piece might shine on them.)

Daily Sources 9/2

1. The WSJ has an editorial praising Japan's Prime Minister Fukuda, but pointing out that his resignation yesterday makes the outlook for the world economy a bit more uncertain.

2. Jay Deshmukh at the AFP reports that the Iraqi cabinet has cleared a deal for China to develop the Al-Ahdab oil field at $6/b service fee. The service contract builds on the original 1997 deal China struck with Saddam Hussein. Production for the first three years is slated to be 25 kb/d, or $54,750,000/year in service fees to China.

3. In his September 1st posting on Informed Comment, Juan Cole writes that the al-Maliki government is mounting a campaign against families that have moved into homes vacated via ethnic cleansing in Iraq and having a hard time convincing 200,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan to return. In the post, he also updates story of tensions between the Kurdistan Regional Government and al-Maliki in Khanaqin in Diyala. Apparently, al-Maliki has also threatened any Peshmerga forces discovered operating in Iraq proper with prosecution.

4. Reuters reports that purchasers of Saudi Arabian crudes expect the country to lift the prices on its heavy sours and reduce the prices on its light sweets. This is likely to make folks in Iran and Venezuela happy, but might upset some folks in Nigeria. It is a response to the change in crack spreads, new sophisticated refining capacity has increased the demand for heavy crudes in Asia which, in turn, reduces the demand for light sweets, which sell at a premium to heavies.

5. Saul Hudson at Reuters reported that Caracas and other "major parts" of Venezuela were hit by a power outage yesterday. Chavez nationalized the largest private electricity company last year.

6. AFP reports that Iran has renewed its call for OPEC to discuss quota busting (member countries producing more than the OPEC agreed-upon production quota) in upcoming September 6th--this Saturday's--meeting.

7. On Sunday, Atul Aneja of India's The Hindu reported that Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki put the blame for the Georgia imbroglio squarely on the shoulders of the Georgian government.

8. Philip Sherwell and William Lowther of The Telegraph reported on Sunday that US intelligence fears that Russia is planning to sell its S-300 missile defense (ground to air) system to Iran, should NATO continue to expand with Georgia and the Ukraine. The Telegraph, it should be noted, is pretty yellow press, just look at the totally unrelated headline "Russia threatens to supply Iran with top new missile system as 'cold war' escalates," and so, everything stated should be taken with a grain of salt, to say the least.

9. The Associated Press reports that Putin complained of the ship build up in the Black Sea today.

10. Philip P. Pan and Temo Bardzimashvil at the Washington Post report that the EU has backed off on threats to impose economic sanctions on Russia as Russia appears to have agreed to move its troops back to the pre-Saakashvili attack positions.

11. Putin announced an agreement to build a new natural gas pipeline through Uzbekistan to move gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Russia's pipeline network, according to Catrina Stewart of the Associated Press. (Readers should be cautioned that these announced "agreements" often don't come to fruition, and, if they do, tend to take a long time to do so. Chinese announcements are an exception, as they usually come to pass quickly, unless the deals are with politically significant countries, like the US, Iran, or Russia.)

12. Thomas M. Hoenig, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, says that financial institutions must be allowed to fail, as per Bloomberg.

Spot Life of Oct 08 CL (wk 1)

AP Satellite Photo of Gustav, 6:55 am EST, 8/30/08, at which time it was category 3, it has apparently just strengthened to category 4.

Well, the life of CL Oct 08 so far has been at the mercy, mostly, of Gustav. It appears to have trumped all other news. Or did it? Prices haven't moved that much since Gustav formed on Monday. And, outside of Gustav, most of the data shows larger and larger declines in demand, reductions in economic growth, increases in supply, increases in capacity, and reduction--Georgia notwithstanding--of political risk. So my guess is that going forward the price is going to fall. (Of course, predicting oil prices is a fools' game, were there ever one. So caveat emptor.)



Oil prices still don't appear to be following the Euro, but, if anything, the reverse.



CL Oct '08 spent the entire 7 days of trading covered in contango, and not just any contango, but the spot month was cheaper than every single forward contract all the way through December 2016! (You can see this via the graph below very clearly as the CL Oct '08 line is far below all the other contract price lines.) This is very very unusual--and I have no idea as to why. It may be that the market believes that in the distant future the situation is such as oil prices must go up ... I believe that at least part of this is due to political risk worries, but I would be hard pressed to say just why. In any case, there is now, hypothetically, good economic reasons for stocks to build, we will see when the EIA report comes out next Wednesday.

Daily Sources 8/30

I am not going to do this every weekend, but given that I have the time (and inclination.)

1. Gustav swells to dangerous Cat 3 storm off Cuba by Will Weissert at the Associated Press. Although the site usually takes the worst case scenario prediction as a given, there is a lot of useful data, discussion, and links about the possible direction and consequences of Gustav at theoildrum.com. To put this in context, the prediction highlighted on the site for Eduard was dire and did not, in any way, come to fruition. Still, very worthwhile data, links and analysis ... just take with a grain of salt.

2. Thomas Erdbrink at the Washington Post writes that the Iranian Depty For Min Ali Reza Sheikh Attar stated in an Iranian television interview that Iran is using 4,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium, which is in the ballpark of the IAEA estimate. Not news, especially, but I guess the Post was looking to fill some space. The article does not note that the IAEA does not concluse that Iran is aiming to use this enriched uranium for the purpose of making nuclear weapons. At the end, the article mentions Putin's interview with CNN Thursday where he says that if the West refuses to take into consideration Russia's interests that the West should then resolve its issues with Iran without Russia's help. Reasonable enough. Sanctions don't have much chance of having the intended effect without being multilateral. Russia is a critical player with respect to Iran, not least because the nuclear power plant under construction in Iran is being built by a Russian consortium.

3. Ellen Knickmayer at the Washington Post gives an analysis of the general response in the Middle East to the Russia-Georgia conflict. Although it is burdened by the paradigm that most of the press has been approaching the conflict with, there are some decent data points. The most interesting bit is on how Turkey may be reappraising to what extent they can rely upon the US in the future. This process has been underway for some time, but I suspect it is mostly a tempest in a teapot. The primary issue is that populist Islam in Turkey--which is conservative, perhaps even revanchist--is growing in political significance. The US seems, at least from the open sources, to have ignored many of Turkey's interests in handling the conflict there, most especially the question of the Kurds. But the conflict in Georgia is likely to remind Turkey of one of the key reasons for its decision to join NATO in the first place--a long history of Russian aggression, nearly always framed as the liberation of oppressed ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire. It is not lost on Turkey that Russia's most important ally in the Caucasus is Armenia. Still, I think that Turkey would support efforts to maintain Armenia's independence should Russia decide they wanted to reincorporate it--and I imagine that they would do so enthusiastically. What has been missing from the discussion overall is a definition of the parties' interests. Interests are always mentioned, as in Condoleeza Rice says "the reason Russia supports our efforts with Iran is because it is in their interests" ... but no one ever actually describes what they think those interests are. In any case, I think that the way most of the information is presented here is alarmist (minus the very last paragraphs) but that there is some good info, nonetheless.

4. Andrew E. Cramer at the New York Times writes that on Friday Georgia officially cut diplomatic relations with Russia and Russia responded in kind.

5. Robert Kagan has an op-ed in the weekend Wall Street Journal arguing that the realists have been proven wrong by events in Georgia, attributing to the realists the notion that economic integration will necessarily bring harmony. This piece is so wrong-headed and deliberately misleading that it is worth linking just to say this is total nonsense. "Realists," who, by the way, count Kissinger among their ranks, do not think that economics trump other considerations. They simply believe that Russia's economic interests are very intertwined with the West, which means that there is a strong disincentive to engage in a serious conflict with the West, as that will undermine their own position. They are in a debate with neocons--like Robert Kagan--who believe that use of force to export American morality to the rest of the world is not only ethically incumbent upon us, but strategically good sense. The problem is that the real reason the neocons are so successful in the public arena is because they agree, with the Idealists, that America should have a moral foreign policy. Realists certainly agree that morality is an important consideration in determining foreign policy, but, cold as this sounds, they think that it is mostly important in determining the staying-power of any given course of action. If it is clear to all that it is a moral course of action, most will stick with it. Otherwise, it is not likely to remain popular for long.

Realists argue, correctly in my opinion, that just because Americans think something is morally correct, does not mean that foreigners agree, and that American foreign policy should be based upon a careful consideration of American interests as well as careful consideration of how local histories will interact with contemporary actions in very foreign places. Certainly, the use of military force is on the table for realists, but they are reluctant to use it in complex situations unless the gains are very clear. They are reluctant to use force in situations on the basis of sentimental attachment to some supposed similarity with ourselves--a sort of narcissistic self-defense, which strings its way through the press. The problem with NATO expansion is not that it is provocative, it is: what American interests were served by such actions when it communicated to Russia--rightly or wrongly--the American understanding that they were still hostiles?!